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HIS Article reviews case law developments in the area of wills, heir-
ship, estate administration, nontestamentary transfers, guardianships,
and trusts. The Survey period covers decisions published between
November 1, 1991, and October 31, 1992.
I. WILLS
A. WILL CONTESTS
In Felderhoff v. Knauf I the court held that a plaintiff who took a nonsuit
could appeal monetary sanctions the trial court imposed prior to the non-
suit.2 The plaintiff filed a will contest in his mother's estate. The trial court
granted sanctions against the plaintiff for discovery abuse. After the trial
court granted the sanctions the plaintiff dropped the contest and the trial
court dismissed the suit without prejudice, with the exception of the sanc-
tions. The plaintiff filed a motion for rehearing on the sanctions issue, which
the trial court overruled. The plaintiff then appealed his sanctions. The
court of appeals, in an unpublished opinion, held that the plaintiff could not
appeal any sanctions the trial court imposed prior to the nonsuit.3 The
supreme court reversed and remanded the cause to the court of appeals. 4 On
remand the court of appeals held that the sanction was not directly related
to plaintiff's conduct so that the sanction was excessive. 5
Two courts considered the availability of a writ of error appeal to chal-
lenge the admission of wills to probate. 6 In In re Estate of Hutchins7 the
* B.A., University of Texas at Arlington; M.L.A., J.D., Southern Methodist University.
Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
1. 819 S.W.2d 110 (Tex. 1991).
2. Id. at I10.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 111. The court stated that if plaintiffs could not appeal sanctions imposed prior
to taking nonsuits then the plaintiffs would have to continue litigation of the case, even if
litigation were not appropriate, in order to preserve the ability to appeal sanctions. Id. The
court thus held that the plaintiff could appeal the imposition of the sanctions. Id.
5. 828 S.W.2d 272, 273 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, writ denied). The appeals court
determined that much of the sanction award was for expenses the defendants incurred in deter-
mining which of the persons that the plaintiff listed in his interrogatories as potential witnesses
supported plaintiff's case. Id. at 274. Thus, the sanctions the trial court imposed did not
directly relate to plaintiff's offensive conduct, which was the failure to list telephone numbers
and addresses of witnesses. Id. Because the sanctions did not relate to the offensive conduct,
the amount of the sanctions was excessive. Id.
6. In re Estate of Hutchins, 829 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ
denied); In re Estate of Hilije, 830 S.W.2d 689 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, no writ).
7. 829 S.W.2d 295.
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court held that it had jurisdiction to consider the writ of error appeal. 8 The
decedent's daughter, who did not participate in the proceedings in which the
will was admitted to probate, brought a writ of error appeal pursuant to
Rule 45 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. 9 The court held that the
daughter did not have to appeal by a bill of review10 or will contest t' and
that it had jurisdiction over the appeal. 12 In In re Estate of Hilje13 the court
determined that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the writ of error ap-
peal.' 4 The trial court dismissed a will contest with prejudice because the
contestants failed to prosecute their suit diligently and for other failures.
The contestants did not file an appeal within the time period for perfecting a
regular appeal. After the time period for perfecting an appeal passed, one of
the contestants filed an application for writ of error. The appeals court
found that the contestant participated at trial, which prevented him from
successfully challenging the trial court's action by writ of error.'5
In Harrington v. Walker 16 the court affirmed the trial court's finding that
part of the testators' estates passed through intestacy because the wills did
not contain language disposing of assets held in trust for the benefit of their
son. 17 The testators had mirror-image wills that, on the death of the second
of them to die, left their residence and personal effects to their daughter and
the residue of their estates in trust for the benefit of their then-living chil-
dren. The testators defined the term "children" to mean their son, daughter,
and grandchildren, but the testators specifically excluded the son's lineal de-
scendants from the definition. The testators' son and daughter, as well as
the daughter's two children, survived the testators. The daughter's trust ter-
minated on the death of the survivor and she received her share outright.
8. Id. at 297.
9. The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure permit an appeal of a final judgment by writ
of error if the appellant files a written petition with the clerk of the court that rendered the
final judgment, if the appellant did not participate in the actual trial, and if the petition states
the names and addresses of all adversely affected parties, describes the judgment sufficiently to
identify it, and states that the appellant wishes to remove the case to the court of appeals for
revision and correction. TEX. R. App. P. 45.
10. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 31 (Vernon 1980).
11. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 93 (Vernon 1980).
12. In re Estate of Hutchins, 829 S.W.2d at 297. The court also held that the county
court should not have admitted the will to probate because the proponents offered no evidence
that the decedent had testamentary capacity when he executed the will and that the witnesses
to the will were credible witnesses. Id. at 300. The court noted that the writ of error appeal
was not a will contest, but was instead a proceeding to set aside the admission of the will to
probate. Id. The proponents of the will failed to meet their burden of proving that the dece-
dent had testamentary capacity when he made the will and that he executed the will validly.
Id.
13. 830 S.W.2d 689.
14. Id, at 690, 692.
15. Id. at 691. The court also found that the application for writ of error failed to name
the estate's executor or any other party who would be adversely affected by the writ of error
appeal. Id. The failure to list the adversely interested parties was an error that defeated the
appeals court's jurisdiction. Id. The court further found that the contestant brought the writ
of error appeal frivolously and imposed sanctions pursuant to TEX. R. App. P. 84. 830 S.W.2d
at 692.
16. 829 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, writ denied).
17. Id. at 936.
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The son's trust continued for his lifetime. The testators' son died and their
daughter brought a will construction suit to determine the disposition of the
son's trust on his death. The daughter contended that the son's trust passed
to her. The son's wife, to whom he left his entire estate, contended that the
son's trust passed by intestacy. The court determined that the testators in-
tended to dispose of their entire estates.18 The court could not infer an in-
tent on the part of the testators to leave the residue of the trust estate to their
daughter on their son's death because the wills did not contain language to
that effect. 19 The daughter could not admit extrinsic evidence of her par-
ents' intent to supply omitted language in the absence of an ambiguity.
20
In Maurer v. Sayre2 l the court held that the alternate beneficiary of three
life insurance policies on the decedent's life had standing to contest the pro-
bate of the will. 22 The decedent executed a will in May 1990, in which she
established a testamentary trust for the benefit of her minor child. In Febru-
ary 1991 decedent executed life insurance beneficiary designation forms in
which she listed the primary beneficiary of the life insurance as the trustee
named in her probated will and the contingent beneficiary as her sister. The
sister contested the probate of the will. The trial court dismissed the contest
on the basis that the sister did not have standing as a person interested in the
decedent's estate.23 The sister appealed. The appeals court determined that
the sister had standing to contest the probate because she had a pecuniary
interest in the decedent's estate that the admission of the decedent's will to
probate would directly affect. 24
B. TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY AND UNDUE INFLUENCE
In Hammer v. Powers25 the court affirmed the trial court's summary judg-
ment that the testator had testamentary capacity and that the primary bene-
ficiary of the will did not exert undue influence. 26 The primary beneficiary
of the testator's will was a young stockbroker who had taken an interest in
18. Id. at 937. The court concluded, however, that the testators did not include a residu-
ary clause in their wills that disposed of the remainder of the son's trust on his death. Id. The
court noted that the testators did not equate the term "beneficiary" with the definition of
"children" contained in the wills, so that the class of beneficiaries was not limited to the testa-
tors' children and the daughter's children. Id.
19. Id. at 938.
20. Id.; see Farah v. First Nat'l Bank, 624 S.W.2d 341, 346 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
21. 833 S.W.2d 680 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, n.w.h.).
22. Id. at 681, 683.
23. Id. at 681. The Texas Probate Code provides that any person interested in the dece-
dent's estate may contest the probate of the decedent's will. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 10
(Vernon 1980). Persons interested in a decedent's estate are "heirs, devisees, spouses, credi-
tors, or any others having a property right in, or claim against, the estate .... " TEX. PROB.
CODE ANN. § 3(r) (Vernon 1980).
24. Maurer, 833 S.W.2d at 682. The court cited Logan v. Thomason, 146 Tex. 37, 41-42,
202 S.W.2d 212, 215 (1947), for the proposition that in order to have standing to contest a will,
a person must have a pecuniary interest that will be materially affected by the admission of the
will to probate. 833 S.W. 2d at 682.
25. 819 S.W.2d 669 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, no writ).
26. Id. at 671.
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the testator and her husband prior to the husband's death in 1988. Follow-
ing the husband's death the stockbroker helped the testator with her daily
business. The testator made a will in 1989 in which she named the stockbro-
ker as co-executor and primary beneficiary. Other beneficiaries of the will
contested the will on the basis that the testator lacked testamentary capacity
when she executed the will and that she executed the will as the result of
undue influence. The trial court determined that the evidence presented
proved that the testator had testamentary capacity as a matter of law and
that the stockbroker did not unduly influence her. The trial court further
held that the contestants could not receive their bequests under the will be-
cause the will contained a no-contest clause and they did not file the contest
in good faith. The appeals court agreed that the summary judgment evi-
dence presented to the trial court demonstrated that the testator was of
sound mind at the time that she executed the 1989 will and that she acted
independently of influence by the stockbroker. 27 The contestants did not file
a response to the motion for summary judgment in a timely manner,
although they later alleged that the affidavits presented with the motion for
summary judgment were defective. The appeals court held that the contes-
tants waived their right to object to the form of the affidavits when they
failed to file a response to the motion for summary judgment in a timely
manner. 28 The court also found that, since the contestants did not allege in
their pleadings that they made their will contest with probable cause and in
good faith, the trial court did not err when it denied them the specific be-
quests that they would have received under the will if they had not contested
it.29
In In re Estate of Riley30 the court upheld a jury finding that the will
proponent exerted undue influence over her husband. 31 The decedent re-
married a much younger woman shortly after his wife died. The decedent's
children did not approve of the marriage and, with the exception of one son,
their relationship with their father deteriorated. The decedent had a major
heart attack soon after his remarriage and required surgery. The day before
the surgery the new wife brought a completed commercially available will
form to her husband to sign. The completed will form left all of the dece-
dent's property to his new wife, or, if she did not survive him, then equally to
his children. At the time the decedent executed the will he stated, in the
presence of witnesses, how he wished to have his estate distributed, which
27. Id. at 671. The court held that the evidence presented with the motion for summary
judgment established that the testator had testamentary capacity as a matter of law and that
the stockbroker did not unduly influence her. Id.
28. Id. at 672.
29. Id. at 673. The court noted that contestants who bring their contest in good faith and
upon reasonable cause will not lose their bequests under the contested will if they prove their
good faith. Id.; see Calvery v. Calvery, 122 Tex. 204, 212-13, 55 S.W.2d 527, 530 (1932);
Gunter v. Pogue, 672 S.W.2d 840, 844 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
These contestants failed to plead or prove that they brought their contest in good faith and
with probable cause. Thus, the trial court did not err when it denied them their specific be-
quests under the will. 819 S.W.2d at 673.
30. 824 S.W.2d 305 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied).
31. Id. at 307.
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was different than the dispositive provisions of the will. Further, the wife
read the will to the decedent after he signed it, but she changed the will's
actual language and stated that it provided that she would receive a life es-
tate in the property with the remainder passing to his youngest son, rather
than the fee simple interest specified in the will. At trial the children intro-
duced evidence that the new wife prevented them from seeing their father.
The jury considered all of the testimony and concluded that the wife exer-
cised undue influence over the testator. They also found that he lacked tes-
tamentary capacity. The appeals court held that sufficient evidence existed
to support the jury's finding of undue influence and that the wife induced the
decedent to sign the will through her fraudulent actions. 32 The court did not
consider the jury's finding of lack of testamentary capacity, however, be-
cause the fact that undue influence existed demonstrated that the decedent
had testamentary capacity, but the finding of undue influence alone was suf-
ficient to deny the will to probate. 33
In Kenney v. Estate of Kenney34 the court affirmed the trial court's finding
that the testator lacked testamentary capacity at the time she executed a will
in August 1990. 35 The testator, who suffered from cancer for at least two
years prior to her death, executed a will in July 1990, in which she left her
entire estate to her children. One week before her death in August 1990 the
testator executed a new will, in which she left her estate to her husband of
thirty-five years, if he survived her, otherwise to her children. The children
offered the July 1990 will for probate and the trial court admitted that will to
probate shortly after the testator's death. Almost three months later, the
testator's husband filed an application that sought to have the trial court set
aside the probate of the July will and admit the August will to probate. The
trial court heard evidence at the hearing on the husband's application from
one of the witnesses to the will and from the notary who notarized the self-
proving affidavit that the testator was alert and conscious when she signed
the August will, although she was very ill. The husband testified that the
testator was able to recognize people and that she was alert and able to un-
derstand that she was making a will on the day that she signed the will, as
well as the day before and the day after she signed the will. The testator's
daughter-in-law testified that the testator talked to her on the day she signed
the will and that she seemed to know what she was doing.
The testator's son, who was the proponent of the July will, however, of-
fered testimony that he visited with his mother on the day she signed the
August will and that she could not remain awake, nor could she talk much
with him. The son also testified that he had not seen his mother read for two
weeks before her death and that she had trouble remembering things for
three weeks before her death. One of the testator's daughters testified that
her mother was unable to stay awake during the last two weeks of her life
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. 829 S.W.2d 888 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no writ).
35. Id. at 893.
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and that she took a lot of medication during that time. Another daughter
testified that her mother took liquid morphine regularly during the last ten
days of her life and that the drug made her mother hallucinate, affected her
memory, and made her drowsy. Another daughter testified that her mother
was confused and could not stay awake; this daughter also testified that she
believed that no one could discuss the will with her mother because her
mother could not stay awake long enough to discuss anything. The appeals
court determined that the trial court could reasonably have determined that
the testator lacked testamentary capacity at the time she signed the August
will and that the trial court's finding was not against the preponderance of
the evidence.3 6
In Watson v. Dingier37 the court affirmed the trial court's conclusion that
the decedent executed his last will as the result of undue influence. 38 The
decedent, who owned and operated an automobile sales lot, died as the result
of brain cancer. During his illness his ex-wife, who lived with decedent after
their divorce, provided most of his care. The decedent's sister also assisted
in his care. About two months before his death the decedent, his sister, and
his ex-wife visited an attorney's office in connection with the preparation and
execution of a will. The decedent left his ex-wife certain items, including his
house, and left the bulk of his estate to his daughter from a previous mar-
riage. The decedent left each of his three children from another marriage
nominal gifts under the will. The decedent suffered increasing paralysis and
an inability to talk during the last two months of his life. The decedent also
behaved in an increasingly paranoid manner, partially as the result of some
of the medication he took. A few days prior to his death decedent argued
with his ex-wife and she moved out of the house. The decedent's daughter
from his first marriage moved in with decedent on the day the ex-wife moved
out.
The next day the daughter took decedent to the attorney to make a new
will, in which she received all of decedent's estate except for nominal gifts to
his other three children. The decedent's condition worsened and he entered
the hospital approximately one week later. The doctor informed the daugh-
ter that her father had only three or four days to live following his admission
to the hospital. The daughter obtained her father's signature to a document
that allowed her to write checks on his bank accounts. Decedent shortly
thereafter fell into a coma from which he never awoke. Five days following
decedent's death the daughter filed an application to probate his last will.
Decedent's ex-wife and his other three children challenged the probate on
the grounds of undue influence and lack of testamentary capacity. A bank
36. Id. The court also held that the fact that no record was made of the hearing in which
the July will was admitted to probate did not cause the husband harm because that hearing
was in an uncontested probate matter. Id. at 893. The husband had the opportunity to set
aside the probate of the July will at the hearing on his application for probate of the August
will, at which the parties developed fully the issue of the testator's revocation of her July will
through execution of her August will in the presence of a court reporter. Id. at 894.
37. 831 S.W.2d 834 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
38. Id. at 838.
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also filed a contest to the daughter's appointment as independent executor,
alleging that the daughter attempted to defraud the bank and to misappro-
priate or convert decedent's funds. The trial court concluded that decedent
executed his last will as the result of his daughter's undue influence and that
the will should not be admitted to probate. The appeals court held that the
evidence presented at the hearing supported the trial court's decision, both
legally and factually. 39 The court also held that it could not review the trial
court's failure to admit the August will to probate because no interested
person offered the August will for probateA0
C. WILL CONSTRUCTION
In Pine v. Salzer4' the court examined a will in which the decedent left
assets designated as her "separate assets" to specified individuals and her
community estate to her surviving spouse. 42 All of the beneficiaries named
in the decedent's will agreed that the assets listed as her separate assets were
in fact community property. The decedent's spouse, who served as adminis-
trator of her estate, petitioned the probate court for a declaratory judgment
and moved for summary judgment claiming that he should receive all of the
property specifically bequeathed to the other beneficiaries since that property
was community property and since the decedent left all of her community
estate to her spouse. The named beneficiaries also filed a motion for sum-
mary judgment in which they requested that the probate court award them
the decedent's one-half of the community assets that she listed in her will as
separate assets. The probate court entered a summary judgement in favor of
the decedent's spouse and the other named beneficiaries appealed, asserting
that the probate court erred in granting the spouse's motion for summary
judgment. The appeals court examined the listing of assets that the decedent
specifically gave to beneficiaries other than her spouse,43 then determined
that the decedent's statement that the assets were separate assets, when they
were in fact community assets, did not make her bequest void." The court
reversed and remanded the cause to the probate court. 45
In Loehr v. Kincannon46 the court examined a joint will that contained an
39. Id. The court noted the factors a court must consider to determine that the testator
executed a will as the result of undue influence. Id. at 837. The contestant must prove that the
influence existed and was exerted, the effect of the influence was to overpower the testator's
decision-making ability at the time of the execution of the will, and the testator would not have
signed the will but for the influence. Id. (citing Rothermel v. Duncan, 369 S.W.2d 917, 922
(Tex. 1963)).
40. Watson, 831 S.W.2d at 838-39.
41. 824 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, n.w.h.).
42. Id. at 780-82.
43. Id. at 781.
44. Id. at 782. The court determined that it could not equate the decedent's use of the
term "separate assets" with separate property and indicated that a fact issue existed as to the
decedent's intent. Id.
45. Id. The court was unable to reverse and render judgment because the appellants did
not include a point of error alleging that the probate court erred in not granting their motion
for summary judgment. Id. at 780.
46. 834 S.W.2d 445 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ).
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invalid restraint on alienation.47 The testators left a fee simple interest in all
of their property, both real and personal, to the survivor of them, but, in the
event the husband survived his wife, the will contained a provision that at-
tempted to prevent him from selling real property that he received under the
will. Following the wife's death the joint will was admitted to probate. The
husband thereafter sold some real property to appellee, who then sought a
declaratory judgment from the trial court requesting the court to find that
the will provision created an unenforceable restraint on alienation. The ap-
pellee filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted.
On appeal the appellants raised two points of error, that the joint will was
contractual in nature and that the will was ambiguous. The appeals court
noted that the appellants did not raise either of these issues when they re-
sponded to the motion for summary judgment, but, even so, their failure to
raise the issues was irrelevant because the trial court correctly found that the
will provision created an unenforceable restraint against alienation.48
D. REVOCATION
In Goode v. Estate of Hoover49 the court examined the issue of whether the
substitution of the first page of a will constituted revocation of the will, re-
sulting in intestacy. 50 The decedent executed a three page self-proved will in
1982. The first page of the will disposed of all of the decedent's estate to his
wife and sisters. The attorney who drafted the will retained a copy of the
executed will in his files. At some point after the decedent executed his will
the decedent or someone else replaced the first page of the will with a page in
which the decedent left all of his estate to his wife. Following the decedent's
death, one of his sisters offered a copy of his 1982 will for probate. The
decedent's wife filed an opposition to probate and sought letters of adminis-
tration in his estate. Both the sister and the wife filed motions for summary
judgment. The trial court granted the sister's motion for summary judg-
ment, found that the decedent properly executed his 1982 will and that he
never revoked that will, and admitted the will to probate. The decedent's
wife died approximately one month following the trial court's judgment and
her executor appealed, alleging that the decedent destroyed his will with the
intent of revoking it when he attached the replacement first page and that
the decedent died intestate. On appeal the court noted the sister had the
burden of proving that the decedent did not revoke his will. 51 The court
stated that only the testator can change or revoke his will. 52 The court con-
cluded that the testator did not intend to revoke his will, even if he replaced
the first page of the will, because the testator left the attestation clause and
47. Id. at 446.
48. Id. The court also found that the will clearly and unambiguously gave the survivor a
fee simple interest in all of the property, id., and that the attempted restraint on alienation was
void. Id. at 447.
49. 828 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, writ denied).
50. Id. at 558.
51. Id. at 559; see TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 88(b)(3) (Vernon 1980).
52. Goode, 828 S.W.2d at 559.
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self-proving affidavit intact.5 3 Further, by substituting the first page, the tes-
tator did not make the changes to the will in a manner provided by law, so
that the original will was valid and entitled to probate. s4
E. MUNIMENT OF TITLE
In Buckner v. Buckner" the court reviewed a judgment admitting a will to
probate as a muniment of title more than four years56 after the decedent's
death.57 The decedent died in 1983. Under the terms of the decedent's will,
he left his surviving spouse a one-half interest in certain real property that he
owned and his son and daughter-in-law the other one-half interest. The
daughter-in-law, who had equal access to the decedent's will with the widow
and the son, requested the son to probate the will on numerous occasions
following the decedent's death. The son and widow did not want to probate
the will and dissuaded the daughter-in-law. The son represented to his wife
on numerous occasions that the property was their property without probate
and that no need existed to probate the will. The son and daughter-in-law,
who had been married for more than thirty years at the time of the dece-
dent's death, had marital problems and the son acknowledged that he
wished for his wife to share in the property following his mother's death, but
only if his wife were married to him at the time of his mother's death. The
son acknowledged that he understood that his wife would own an undivided
one-fourth of the property if the will were admitted to probate and that he
wanted the property to stay in his family. The daughter-in-law finally of-
fered the will for probate more than four years following the decedent's
death. The widow and son contested the probate. The jury found that the
daughter-in-law was not in default for failing to offer the will for probate
within four years following the decedent's death because her husband de-
frauded her concerning the effect of the probate. The probate court admit-
ted the will to probate as a muniment of title following the jury's verdict.
The son and mother appealed, alleging, among other things, that no evi-
dence or insufficient evidence existed to support the jury's verdict. The ap-
peals court noted that the son's representations to his wife concerning the
effect of the probate constituted a legal opinion that under most circum-
stances would not support an action for fraud, but that one exception to this
rule is when a confidential relationship exists between the parties.58 The
53. Id. at 560.
54. Id.
55. 815 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1991, no writ).
56. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 73(a) (Vernon 1980) provides that a will may not be admit-
ted to probate more than four years after the death of the decedent unless the will proponent
can prove that he or she were not in default for not offering the will for probate at an earlier
date. Because letters testamentary or of administration may not be granted more than four
years after the decedent's death in most instances, see TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 73(a), 74
(Vernon 1980), the only manner in which the will may be admitted to probate is as a muni-
ment of title. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 89 (Vernon Supp. 1993).
57. Buckner, 815 S.W.2d at 878-82.




court concluded that sufficient evidence existed to support the jury's finding
that the son materially misrepresented the facts to his wife. 59 The court also
found that the daughter-in-law relied on her husband's misrepresentations to
her own detriment since she could not receive her undivided one-fourth in-
terest in the property unless the will were admitted to probate.60
II. HEIRSHIP
In Cahill v. Lyda6' the supreme court held that an attorney ad litem who
represented unknown heirs during an appeal should be compensated for rea-
sonable attorney's fees and expenses. 62 The underlying cause of action was a
suit to establish title to a tract of real property by adverse possession. The
plaintiff brought the suit against the record title holders and unknown heirs.
The trial court appointed an attorney ad litem to represent the unknown
heirs. The parties all agreed to sell the tract of land and to place the pro-
ceeds from the sale in the registry of the court. The trial court found that
the plaintiff failed to establish her ownership by adverse possession and
awarded title to the property to the record title holders and unknown heirs.
The trial court ordered payment of the ad litem's fees from the portion of the
sales proceeds set aside for the unknown heirs. The plaintiff appealed and
the court of appeals reversed the trial court in an unpublished opinion. The
court of appeals charged the cost of the appeals against the unknown heirs
and refused to award the ad litem any fees for his services during the appeal.
The supreme court ruled that the plaintiff did not establish her ownership of
the property by adverse possession and reversed and remanded the cause to
the court of appeals. 63 The court of appeals refused to award the ad litem
attorney's fees on the remand. 64 The supreme court noted that the trial
court had to appoint an ad litem to represent the unknown heirs and that the
ad litem should receive a reasonable fee for his services.65
In Northwestern National Casualty Co. v. Doucette66 the court considered
whether the subsequent adoption of the decedent's natural son by the son's
59. Id. at 882. The court noted that the son did not himself know Texas law concerning
intestate succession, but that the son nevertheless made the statements to his wife with the
intent to prevent her from offering the will for probate. Id. at 881-82.
60. Id. at 882.
61. 826 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. 1992) (per curiam).
62. Id. at 932, 933.
63. Rhodes v. Cahill, 802 S.W.2d 643, 646 (Tex. 1990) (op. on mot. for reh'g).
64. Cahill v. Lyda, 814 S.W.2d 390, 396-97 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991), rev'd in part, 826
S.W.2d 932 (Tex. 1992).
65. Cahill, 826 S.W.2d at 933 (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 244). The court also noted that an
ad litem must fully represent the unknown heirs and also represent their interests on appeal, if
necessary. Id. (citing Executors of the Estate of Tartt v. Harpold, 531 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). The court stated as follows:
"[u]nder the court of appeals' holding, an attorney ad litem seeking to protect on appeal a
verdict favorable to his unknown clients would receive no compensation for any unsuccessful
post-trial work. This result effectively makes the attorney ad litem's fees contingent upon
success at the appellate court level." Id. The court thus held that the attorney ad litem in this
case should receive reasonable fees and expenses incurred during the appellate process. Id.
66. 817 S.W.2d 396 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, writ denied).
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stepfather prevented the child from being an heir of the decedent. 67 Dece-
dent and his natural son's mother were married at the time of the son's birth,
but they subsequently divorced. The son's mother remarried and the son's
stepfather adopted the son some five years following the mother's and stepfa-
ther's marriage. The adoption took place in Arizona. The decedent married
again and had a daughter with his second wife. The decedent died intestate
in 1984, and decedent's second wife and daughter filed a joint application for
declaration of heirship and for issuance of letters of administration. The
second wife and daughter stated in their application that decedent was only
married once, to the second wife, that he was never divorced, that he only
had one child, the daughter, and that he was not survived by parents or
collateral kin. The daughter disclaimed her interest in the decedent's estate
after she and her mother filed the application. The probate court appointed
the second wife independent administrator of the decedent's estate and
found that the wife and daughter's allegations and statements included in the
application were true. The natural son later filed a declaration of heirship
and sought partition of the decedent's estate. The probate court determined
that the natural son was an heir of the decedent, removed the second wife as
administrator of the estate because she had defrauded the court in her repre-
sentations concerning the decedent's heirs, and appointed the son as succes-
sor administrator of the estate. In a second trial, the probate court found
that the second wife and her bonding company owed the son damages and
interest. In a third trial the probate court found that the daughter's dis-
claimer was effective. The bonding company and the wife and daughter ap-
pealed the probate court's findings. On appeal the court held that the
natural son's adoption in Arizona did not affect his right of inheritance in
Texas. 68
In B. C.S. v. D.A.E. 69 the court considered whether the adoption of minor
children affects their inheritance rights from a natural half-sibling. 70 The
natural mother had two children by her first marriage. Shortly before the
mother and her first husband divorced, an adoption decree terminated their
parental rights to their two children. The mother married a second time and
again had two children, including the decedent. The mother again divorced,
remarried, and had a child, the appellant, who was born in 1982. The dece-
dent died as the result of an automobile accident in 1984. The trial court
found that the two children from the mother's first marriage, although they
67. Id. at 397.
68. Id. at 398. The court relied on Martinez v. Gutierrez, 66 S.W.2d 678, 682 -83 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1933, holding approved), to reach its conclusion that, although Arizona law
controls the natural son's adoption, Texas law controls the descent and distribution of the
decedent's estate. Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co., 817 S.W.2d at 399. The court also held that
the probate court did not err in awarding the son prejudgment interest in excess of the face
amount of the surety bond rather than limiting the judgment to the amount of the penal sum
named in the bond. Id. at 399-400. The court further found that the daughter's disclaimer
met the statutory requirements for a disclaimer found in TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 37A
(Vernon Supp. 1993) and that the probate court did not err in determining that the daughter's
disclaimer was valid and irrevocable. Northwestern Nat'! Cas. Co., 817 S.W.2d at 401.
69. 818 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1991, writ denied).
70. Id. at 929-30.
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were subsequently adopted by others, were siblings of the half blood of the
decedent and, thus, were heirs of the decedent. The appeals court af-
firmed. 7 1 The court noted that the Legislature has provided that an adopted
child may still inherit from the natural parent and through the natural par-
ent 72 and stated that the Legislature could have specified that an adopted
child could not inherit from other children of the natural parent.73
In Espiricueta v. Vargas74 the court affirmed the trial court's finding of
paternity in a determination of heirship proceeding. 75 The decedent, a mi-
nor child, died as the result of severe bums she received in an apartment fire.
At the time the decedent was born, her mother was married, but the mother
had not lived with her husband for some time. Prior to the decedent's birth,
her mother had lived with another man, who was listed as the decedent's
father on her birth certificate and, subsequently, on her death certificate.
The alleged father had acknowledged his paternity to hospital officials at the
time of the decedent's birth and he knew he was listed as her father on her
birth certificate. Following decedent's death, her mother divorced her hus-
band and the divorce decree stated that the decedent was born during the
marriage. The husband assigned all of his interest in the decedent's estate to
the mother. The mother and the alleged natural father both filed applica-
tions for appointment as administrator of decedent's estate, which consisted
mostly of a personal injury cause of action. The trial court, in the determi-
nation of heirship proceeding, found that the alleged father was indeed dece-
dent's natural father and assigned one-half of the decedent's estate each to
the mother and the natural father. The mother appealed. The appeals court
first determined that the statement contained in the divorce decree finding
that the decedent was born during her mother's marriage did not constitute
a decree of paternity. 76 The court next determined that the trial court cor-
rectly presumed the natural father to be the decedent's father. 77 The court
found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the
alleged natural father was in fact the biological father rather than the
mother's husband because of the evidence presented at the trial.78
71. Id. at 929, 930.
72. Id. at 930; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.07 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
73. 818 S.W.2d at 930.
74. 820 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, writ denied).
75. Id. at 18, 21.
76. Id. at 19. The court found that the statement in the divorce decree that the decedent
was born during the mother's marriage was not res judicata to the determination of heirship
proceeding because the natural father was not a party to the divorce proceeding. Id.
77. Id. at 20. The court found that the trial court made this presumption under TEX
FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.02(a)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1993). Espiricueta, 820 S.W.2d at 21.
78. 820 S.W.2d at 21. The mother had stipulated that the alleged natural father was the
biological father. Further, the mother had not lived with her husband for more than two years
prior to the decedent's birth, although she lived with the natural father prior to the decedent's
birth. The natural father told hospital personnel at the time of the decedent's birth that he was
her father and he signed the birth certificate, which stated that he was the father. Finally, the
mother called the natural father prior to the decedent's death to advise him of his child's
injuries and she provided his name to the coroner as the name of the decedent's father for
purposes of the death certificate.
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In Curry v. Williman 79 the court held that natural parents may inherit
from their children who have been equitably adopted by others.80 The dece-
dent, who was severely retarded as the result of negligence at the time of her
birth, lived with her father and his second wife following her parents' di-
vorce. The decedent's mother had no contact with the decedent following
the divorce, although she opposed the stepmother's legal adoption attempt.
The decedent's father predeceased her and the stepmother was appointed as
decedent's guardian. At decedent's death, her full brother and three half-
siblings filed an application for determination of heirship in which they
sought to divide the decedent's estate between themselves. Decedent's
mother filed a motion for summary judgment in which she claimed one-half
of decedent's estate. The trial court granted the mother's motion and deter-
mined that the mother should receive one-half of the estate, the full brother
should receive one-fifth of the estate, and each half-sibling should receive
one-tenth of the estate. The decedent's brother and half-siblings appealed,
alleging that the stepmother equitably adopted the decedent, which resulted
in the termination of the natural mother's inheritance rights. The court
found that equitable adoption protects the inheritance rights of the equitably
adopted child.8 ' The court noted that the supreme court has previously re-
fused to hold that persons who stand in the relationship of equitably adop-
tive parents may inherit from an equitably adopted child;82 thus the natural
mother may still inherit from her child.83 The court also found that even if a
fact issue existed as to whether the stepmother equitably adopted the dece-
dent, the issue was not a genuine issue of material fact that would preclude
summary judgment.84
III. ESTATE ADMINISTRATION
A. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS
In Bandy v. First State Bank, Overton"5 the court considered the issue of
whether a bank in which a decedent has deposits and to which the decedent
owes a debt has the right to setoff the decedent's bank accounts against the
amount of the debt without first presenting a claim for the debt to the ad-
ministrator.8 6 The decedent died intestate. At the time of his death, the
decedent had several certificates of deposit and a checking account on de-
posit at the bank. The decedent also owed the bank debt obligations evi-
denced by several promissory notes. One week following the decedent's
death the county court appointed two temporary co-administrators of dece-
dent's estate. The co-administrators were given the responsibility for man-
aging decedent's businesses, which included two clubs, a grocery store, and
79. 834 S.W.2d 443 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ denied).
80. Id. at 444.
81. Id. at 444-45.
82. Id. at 445 (citing Heien v. Crabtree, 369 S.W.2d 28, 30 (Tex. 1963)).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. 835 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. 1992).
86. Id. at 611.
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two farms. During the temporary administration the temporary administra-
tors endorsed a total of five of decedent's certificates of deposit to the bank
for payments on decedent's notes. At the expiration period for the tempo-
rary administration, it was not renewed. Some three weeks later the county
court appointed a permanent administrator of decedent's estate.
During the period of time in which the estate had no administrator the
bank setoff sums in decedent's checking account against the amount then
due on one of the promissory notes. Following his appointment, the perma-
nent administrator requested and received the sums then on deposit in the
decedent's checking accounts. A few days after the permanent administra-
tor's appointment, one of the two former temporary administrators endorsed
a certificate of deposit and received the full amount of the certificate. The
certificate of deposit was payable either to the decedent or to the former
temporary administrator. The administrator subsequently determined that
the bank still held two certificates of deposit payable to the decedent. The
administrator sought and obtained an ex parte order from the county court
ordering the bank to release the two certificates and any other of decedent's
assets held by the bank. The administrator then demanded payment of the
certificates from the bank. After refusing to comply with the demand, the
bank setoff the proceeds of one of the two remaining certificates of deposit
against another note when the note came due and issued a new certificate of
deposit in the estate's name with the funds in the certificate in excess of the
amount of the note payment. The bank submitted two sworn claims to the
administrator, one of which requested retroactive approval of one setoff and
the other of which requested payment on a loan that the decedent had co-
signed. The administrator rejected both claims. The bank later setoff from
another certificate of deposit the amount of the deficiency on the note that
the decedent had co-signed, after the sale of the collateral. The administra-
tor sued the bank on the basis that the bank converted the certificates of
deposit.87 The bank answered that the temporary administrators had en-
dorsed the certificates of deposit that it received during the period of tempo-
rary administration, that it properly paid to the temporary administrator the
certificate of deposit that she had endorsed as joint owner, and that it had an
equitable right to setoff the other certificates of deposit against debts the
estate still owed to the bank. The trial court, without a jury, found that the
bank converted all of the certificates of deposit and awarded actual and puni-
tive damages. The appeals court, in an unpublished opinion, reversed the
trial court on the basis that the bank had an equitable right to setoff the
debts against the decedent's funds on deposit at the bank. The appeals court
further held that the bank correctly paid the jointly owned certificate of de-
posit to the joint owner. The supreme court determined first that, even if the
temporary co-administrators acted beyond their power in endorsing the cer-
tificates of deposit to the bank, the bank was not liable for relying on the
87. The administrator also alleged that the bank's actions resulted in significant cash flow




temporary administrator's authority to act for the estate.88 The supreme
court held that the temporary administrators' payment of the certificates of
deposit to the bank was appropriate and that the bank did not convert the
certificates, nor did it setoff the certificates against the decedent's debt.89
The supreme court further held that the bank was not liable for paying the
jointly owned certificate of deposit to the joint owner.90 The court held that
the bank did not convert the funds represented by the jointly owned certifi-
cate of deposit, nor did it setoff the funds represented by the certificate of
deposit against decedent's debts. 9' The court further held that the bank had
an equitable right to setoff its unmatured claims against the decedent's funds
on deposit whether or not the estate was solvent or insolvent at the time of
the setoff and that the bank had the right to setoff the certificates of deposit
against the decedent's debts.92 The court also held that, since the adminis-
trator provided no proof that the bank wrongfully took possession of joint
accounts, the bank acted within its rights in exercising its equitable right of
setoff against the certificates of deposit and the checking account.93 The
dissent strongly disagreed with the majority opinion and stated that the ma-
jority erred in adopting a position that would protect banks that already
have protection and interfere with proper administration of many estates. 94
In Monson v. Betancourt95 the court conditionally granted a writ of man-
damus ordering the county court to appoint a co-executor.96 The decedent's
will named his two children to serve as co-independent executors. The trial
court admitted the will to probate and appointed the decedent's daughter to
serve as executor. The trial court refused to appoint the decedent's son to
88. 835 S.W.2d at 614. The court also found that the administrator did not prove that the
temporary administrators acted beyond the scope of their authority. Id. The administrator
provided the trial court with no evidence that the temporary administrators paid notes that the
decedent made for nonbusiness purposes. Id. at 615.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 616-17. The court found that pursuant to TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 445
(Vernon Supp. 1993) the bank could properly pay the certificate of deposit to the joint owner.
835 S.W.2d at 616. The court further found that the bank was not liable for its payment of the
funds held in the certificate of deposit to the joint owner because it was not under written
notice from anyone entitled to give notice that withdrawals from the certificate of deposit
should not be made, as provided in TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 448 (Vernon 1980). 835 S.W.2d
at 616. The court found that the administrator's notice to the bank was defective because the
administrator did not make his first demand in writing and the court issued its order concern-
ing the accounts more than a month after the bank paid the certificate of deposit to the joint
owner. Id.
91. 835 S.W.2d at 616-17.
92. Id. at 622. The court noted the claims procedures and the bank's options under the
claims procedures set forth in TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 306 (Vernon 1980). 835 S.W.2d at
617. The court then analyzed case law developed in other jurisdictions concerning the bank's
right to setoff. Id. at 618-22.
93. Bandy, 835 S.W.2d at 622.
94. Id. at 622-26 (Gammage, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that the majority's view
that offset would not harm a solvent estate was incorrect because of the underlying assumption
that the solvent estate's assets were liquid. Id. at 625. The dissent would require a bank to
prove that an estate is insolvent in order to avail itself of the equitable right of offset. Id. at
626.
95. 818 S.W.2d 499 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, no writ).
96. Id. at 500.
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serve as co-executor on the basis that the estate did not require two persons
to serve as executor and that the son was not present at the hearing. The
trial court received evidence at the hearing that both children were qualified
to serve as executors. After the hearing the son filed his appointment of
registered agent and asked the trial court to reconsider its order. The trial
court still refused to appoint the son co-executor and both children filed a
petition for writ of mandamus with the appeals court. The appeals court
found that the trial court erred by refusing to appoint the son as co-executor
because he was qualified to serve as executor and he appointed a registered
agent to receive service for him since he was not a Texas resident. 97
In Collins v. Baker9" the court conditionally granted a writ of mandamus
compelling the county court to vacate orders that prevented the independent
executrix from fulfilling her duties. 99 The county court admitted the dece-
dent's will to probate and appointed the decedent's daughter independent
executrix as provided in the decedent's will. The executrix filed her oath and
the inventory, appraisement and list of claims of the estate. Subsequently,
one of the beneficiaries under the will petitioned the court to order the
maker to pay the next payment under a promissory note, which was the
primary asset of the estate, to the registry of the court. The court ordered
the maker to make all future note payments to the registry of the court. The
county court later ordered the independent executrix to make certain pay-
ments and to deposit additional estate monies into the registry of the court,
and ordered the clerk to make a partial distribution of a gift under the will to
a beneficiary. The independent executrix filed a petition for writ of manda-
mus alleging that the county court had no authority to assume responsibility
for controlling the administration and settlement of the estate. The appeals
court found no authority in the Probate Code00 for the county court to
assume the administration of the decedent's estate in contravention of the
terms of the decedent's will.' 0 ' The court noted that the county court had in
effect transformed an independent administration to a dependent administra-
tion through its orders.' 0 2
B. JURISDICTION
In Palmer v. Coble Wall Trust Co. 103 the court considered the extent of a
97. Id. The court indicated that the trial court did not have discretion to refuse to ap-
point a qualified person named to serve as executor or co-executor in the decedent's will. Id.
98. 825 S.W.2d 555 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ).
99. Id. at 555, 557.
100. The Texas Probate Code provides that a testator may state in his will that "no other
action shall be had in the county court in relation to the settlement of his estate than the
probating and recording of his will, and the return of an inventory, appraisement, and list of
claims of his estate." TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 145(b) (Vernon Supp. 1993). The decedent
provided for appointment of his daughter as independent executor in his will, so that the only
action that should have been taken in the county court would have been admitting the will to
probate, recording the will, and receiving the filed inventory, appraisement, and list of claims.
825 S.W.2d at 555.
101. Collins, 825 S.W.2d at 556-57.
102. Id. at 557.
103. 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 120 (Oct. 31, 1992).
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statutory probate court's jurisdiction in 1985 under the provisions of Texas
Probate Code section 5A(b), 1°4 as it then existed.' 05 The probate court ap-
pointed the trust company guardian of the estate of an incompetent ward.
The guardian developed an estate plan for the ward and, upon application by
the guardian, the probate court approved the estate plan. Following the
ward's death the probate court granted letters of temporary administration
to the trust company for the purpose of completing the estate plan. Soon
thereafter the court appointed the permanent independent administrator of
the estate. The independent administrator decided that the estate plan that
the trust company had developed was exceedingly complex and caused the
estate to pay exorbitant fees to the trust company. The independent admin-
istrator of the estate brought suit in the statutory probate court against the
trust company as the estate's former temporary administrator and the presi-
dent of the trust company for negligence, gross negligence, and violations of
the deceptive trades practices act, 106 including breach of fiduciary duty. The
jury found for the independent executor and the probate court entered judg-
ment for the independent executor. The court of appeals reversed and ren-
dered judgment in favor of the trust company for the reason that the probate
court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the suit. 10 7 The supreme
court noted that section 5A(b) of the Probate Code 08 provides the subject
matter jurisdiction of statutory courts.' 9 The court of appeals had applied
the 1985 amendment to section 5A(b)" 0 and determined that the probate
court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the case because the
causes of action were not "appertaining to" or "incident to" the estate."' 1
The supreme court reversed the court of appeals because it found that the
statutory probate court had concurrent jurisdiction with the district court
since the cause of action was filed by the independent administrator against
the temporary administrator. 12 The dissent did not agree that the 1985
amendment contemplated a case against a former personal representative for
the causes of action included in this case." 3
104. Act of June 13, 1979, 66th Leg., R.S., ch. 713, § 3, 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws 1741;
amended by Act of June 15, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 875, § 1, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 2995;
amended by Act of June 17, 1987, 70th Leg., R.S., ch. 459, § 1, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 2044;
amended by Act of June 16, 1989, 71st Leg., R.S., ch. 1035, § 3, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 4163-64.
105. 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 120.
106. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE § 17.41-.63 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1993).
107. 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 122.
108. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5A(b) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
109. 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 121.
110. Act of June 13, 1979, 66th Leg., R.S., ch. 713, § 3, 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws 1741;
amended by Act of June 15, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 875, § 1, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 2995.
111. 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 121-22.
112. Id. at 123. The 1985 amendment specifically stated that the statutory probate courts
would have concurrent jurisdiction with the district courts over actions by or against personal
representatives of estates. Act of June 15, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 875, § 1, 1985 Tex. Gen.
Laws 2996. The case falls within the 1985 amendment because it is a case brought by a per-
sonal representative against the previous personal representative of the estate. 36 Tex. Sup. Ct.
J. at 123.
113. 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 123-25 (Cornyn, J., dissenting).
1993] 1847
SMU LAW REVIEW
In Naranjo v. Naranjo'14 the court found that the trial court did not have
jurisdiction to set aside the conveyance of the decedent's deceased spouse's
one-half interest in real property since the spouse's estate was not a party to
the action.' 15 The decedent and her husband conveyed real property to one
of their sons in a recorded warranty deed that reserved to themselves the use
of the property for their lives. The decedent's husband predeceased her by
many years. Following the decedent's death, her executor brought suit to
have the conveyance set aside. The estate of the decedent's husband was not
a party to the action. The trial court set aside the deed altogether. On ap-
peal the court found that since the husband's estate was not a party to the
action, the trial court could only set aside the conveyance of the decedent's
one-half interest in the property.' 1 6
In Bruflat v. Rodeheaver 17 the court affirmed the probate court's decision
that the probate court did not have jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus
to the county clerk ordering the clerk to file a family settlement agreement in
the real property records of the county.' 18 The appellant attempted to file a
family settlement agreement in the real property records of Harris County.
The county clerk refused to file the document because it did not comply with
recording requirements. The appellant filed a petition for writ of mandamus
with the probate court, in which he requested the court to order the county
clerk to file the settlement agreement. The county clerk asserted that the
probate court did not have jurisdiction over the filing because filing the in-
strument is not an action brought by the estate's personal representative in
the capacity of personal representative and that filing the agreement is not
incident to the estate. The probate court found that it lacked jurisdiction to
issue the writ of mandamus to compel the county clerk to file the agreement.
On appeal the court found that the mandamus action was not incident to the
settlement of the decedent's estate. 119
In Eppenauer v. Eppenauer120 the court held that a district court had con-
current original jurisdiction with the county court over an action to remove
an independent executor. 121 Appellant filed the application to probate her
husband's will in the County Court of Presidio County. Presidio County
does not have a statutory probate court, county court at law, or other statu-
tory court with the jurisdiction of a statutory probate court. The county
court admitted the will to probate and appointed appellant independent ex-
ecutrix. The appellees thereafter filed an action in the county court to re-
114. 815 S.W.2d 882 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1991, writ denied).
115. Id. at 884.
116. Id. The court noted that the husband's one-half interest in the property vested in the
grantee following the husband's death in 1972. The court further noted that even if the hus-
band's estate had been made a party to the action, any cause of action as to his one-half of the
property would be barred by the statute of limitations. Id. The court also held that the trial
court properly set aside the deed as to the decedent's one-half interest in the property. Id.
117. 830 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, n.w.h.), disapproved by 36 Tex.
Sup. Ct. J. 120 (Tex. 1992).
118. Id. at 824-25.
119. Id.
120. 831 S.W.2d 30 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, n.w.h.).
121. Id. at 34.
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quire appellant to post a bond and subsequently filed a motion in the county
court to transfer to the district court the pending motion to compel bond.
The county court transferred the action and the appellants then sought to
have the district court remove the independent executrix, which the district
court did. The former independent executrix appealed, asserting that the
district court did not have jurisdiction to remove her from her position since
the county court did not transfer the removal action to the district court.
The appeals court determined that the district court had concurrent jurisdic-
tion with the county court over the removal action.122
C. ESTATE ADMINISTRATION
In In re Estate of Ortiz1 23 the court examined the reasonableness of attor-
ney's fees and funeral expenses. 124 The decedent, a Mexican citizen, died as
the result of an automobile accident in Victoria County. A funeral home
spoke with the decedent's family in Mexico and handled all of the funeral
arrangements. The family contacted the Mexican Consular in Corpus
Christi, who hired an attorney to represent the family. Almost two months
after the decedent's death the probate court appointed the director of the
funeral home as temporary administrator of the decedent's estate. The di-
rector did not provide notice to the decedent's family. The temporary ad-
ministrator filed an application with the court for approval of a contract
with an attorney to represent the estate in recovering damages that resulted
from the decedent's death. The court approved the contract with the attor-
ney. The court later approved the inventory filed in the estate, which listed
as the estate's only asset the claim against the insurance company. The in-
ventory listed the claim filed by the funeral home for funeral expenses as the
only claim against the estate. The temporary administrator signed a release
agreement with the insurance company for one of the other drivers involved
in the automobile accident for $25,000. The attorney for the family and the
Mexican Consular also signed a similar release agreement as representatives
of the family. Soon thereafter the court appointed the temporary adminis-
trator the permanent administrator, ordered the $25,000 paid to the registry
of the court, and ordered that no withdrawals could be made from the insur-
ance proceeds without a written court order. The court then signed orders
approving payments of the claims of the doctor and the hospital that treated
the decedent following the accident, as well as payments to the funeral home
and the attorney who negotiated with the insurance company. The family,
through the Mexican Consular and their attorney, protested the payments to
the funeral home and the attorney at the hearing. The trial court found that
the amount of the funeral home's claim was reasonable and that the amount
of the attorney's fees awarded to the attorney who negotiated with the insur-
ance company was that specified in the employment contract that the court
had previously approved. The family appealed. On appeal the court found
122. Id.
123. 815 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, no writ).
124. Id. at 860-63.
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that the evidence supported the award of attorney's fees 125 and the payment
of the funeral home.126
In Tinney v. Team Bank' 27 the court considered the appeal of a suit on a
promissory note.' 28 In 1983 J.I. Harvey, who is now deceased and whose
executor was Team Bank, executed a promissory note payable to Charles W.
Tinney, also deceased. A vendor's lien deed of trust secured payment of the
note. Following Tinney's death, Harvey negotiated with Tinney's independ-
ent executor, in the executor's individual capacity, and others to purchase a
truck stop. As part of the negotiations, Harvey attempted to get the in-
dependent executor to release the lien securing payment of the 1983 promis-
sory note. Harvey executed the contract for the purchase of the truck stop
in consideration of the release of the note. The independent executor later
sued Harvey on the note. Harvey died after the suit was brought. The trial
court found that the consideration was sufficient to support the contract for
the truck stop and that the result was the release of the indebtedness. The
court of appeals disagreed because no evidence existed that Tinney's estate
received any consideration for the discharge of indebtedness.129 The appeals
court also found that Harvey knew that he made the agreement to purchase
the truck stop with the independent executor individually, that part of the
negotiations was the release of an obligation due to the estate, that none of
the sales proceeds from the purchase of the truck stop were to go to the
estate, and that Harvey should have known that he and the independent
executor were negotiating the transaction to the detriment of the estate.130
Because the estate never received consideration for release of the note, the
appeals court held that the estate's independent executor should recover the
principal amount of the note, plus prejudgment interest as set forth in the
note,' 3 ' and reversed and remanded the cause for a new trial. 132
D. MARITAL PROPERTY CHARACTERIZATIONS
In Beck v. Beck'3 3 the court determined that the 1980 amendment to arti-
125. Id. at 863. The family's attorney had begun negotiations with the insurance company
prior to the appointment of the temporary administrator. The final settlement amount was the
same as that the family's attorney had negotiated. Further, the estate's attorney had attempted
to garnish the insurance proceeds to secure payment of the funeral home bill prior to the time
he filed the application for appointment of the funeral home director as temporary administra-
tor. When the attorney filed the application on behalf of the funeral home director, he did not
serve notice on either the family's attorney or the Mexican Consular, although he knew that
both of them were actively involved on the family's behalf. The court nevertheless determined
that the evidence that the administrator did not need to hire the attorney did not outweigh the
trial court's finding that the fees were reasonable. Id.
126. Id.
127. 819 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, writ denied).
128. Id. at 561-65.
129. Id. at 562-63. The court found that the trial court erred when it refused to allow the
independent executor to testify that Harvey had not paid the note. Id. at 563.
130. Id. at 564.
131. Id.
132. 819 S.W.2d at 565 (op. on mot. for reh'g). The court remanded the issue of attorney's
fees for the independent executor of Tinney's estate. Id.
133. 814 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1266 (1992).
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cle XVI, section 15, of the Texas Constitution 134 retroactively applies to pre-
marital agreements entered into before the date of the amendment. 135 The
decedent and his spouse entered into a premarital agreement shortly before
their marriage in 1977. The agreement provided that income from separate
property would remain the separate property of the spouse who owned the
property rather than being community property. The wife derived signifi-
cant income from her separate property. Following the husband's death, his
son was appointed independent executor. The son sued the wife in his indi-
vidual capacity and as independent executor for one-half of the income gen-
erated by her separate property during the marriage. The son sought a
declaratory judgment that the premarital agreement was unenforceable
under the Texas Constitution 136 as it existed at the time the parties entered
the agreement. Both the son and the wife filed motions for partial summary
judgment on the issue of the validity of the premarital agreement. The trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of the wife and the court of ap-
peals affirmed on the basis that the agreement constituted an exchange of
each spouse's community property interest in the future income from sepa-
rate property. 137 The supreme court determined that the 1948 amendment
to the Texas Constitution 138 did not allow the future partition of income
earned from separate property and that the agreement was not enforceable
under the Texas Constitution 139 as it existed at the time the parties entered
the agreement. 40 The court noted that the 1980 amendment to the Consti-
tution 41 allows persons about to marry to partition property between them-
selves. 14 2 The court examined the legislative intent behind the 1980
amendment and determined that the legislature intended to validate existing
premarital agreements that contained partition provisions."43 The court
held that the legislature and Texas citizens intended the 1980 amendment to
apply retroactively to premarital agreements in existence at the time of the
amendment, including the agreement at issue in this case. 144 The concurring
opinion stated that the courts should use the doctrine of implied validation
conservatively and only in cases in which the intent for retroactive applica-
134. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15.
135. 814 S.W.2d at 749.
136. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15 (1948, amended 1980).
137. Beck v. Beck, 792 S.W.2d 813, 816 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990), affid, 814 S.W.2d 745
(Tex. 1991).
138. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15 (1948, amended 1980).
139. Id.
140. Beck, 814 S.W.2d at 747.
141. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15 (1980, amended 1987).
142. 814 S.W.2d at 747.
143. Id. at 748. The court, in making this determination, applied the doctrine of implied
validation, which previously had not been adopted by Texas courts, but which Professor Mc-
Knight proposed as a basis for applying the 1980 amendment to premarital agreements already
in effect when the amendment was passed. Id. at 747-48. See Joseph W. McKnight, The
Constitutional Redefinition of Texas Matrimonial Property As It Affects Antenuptial and Inter-
spousal Transactions, 13 ST. MARY'S L.J. 449, 474-75 (1982).
144. 814 S.W.2d at 749. The court made its decision based on the public policy in favor of
enforcing premarital agreements. Id.
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tion of a law is unmistakable. 14 5
In Pearce v. Pearce146 the court considered the issue of reimbursement to
the community estate for efforts expended by the deceased spouse on behalf
of his separate estate. 147 Soon after the decedent and his wife married they
entered into a trust agreement concerning the decedent's separate property,
which was placed into the trust. The trust agreement specifically stated that
the assets held in trust were the decedent's separate property and that any
income or increase in value of the trust assets would remain the decedent's
separate property. The agreement further stated that the wife would have no
community property rights or other rights in the property unless the parties
later modified the agreement in writing. Following the decedent's death, his
wife filed suit against the decedent's son, individually and in his capacities as
trustee of the trust created under the trust agreement and independent exec-
utor of the decedent's estate. The wife sought to have the trust agreement
declared unenforceable because it resulted from fraud and unconscionability.
The wife also sought to have her one-half of the community estate awarded
to her and to receive reimbursement to the community estate for the dece-
dent's efforts expended on his separate property held in the trust. The trial
court first found that the trust agreement was not unconscionable as a mat-
ter of law. The other issues were submitted to the jury, who found that the
wife executed the trust agreement of her own free will, that the community
estate was entitled to reimbursement for the decedent's efforts expended on
his separate property, and that the decedent's estate was not entitled to any
reimbursement from the community estate. The trial court entered a take
nothing judgment in favor of the wife, who appealed. The appeals court first
determined that the trust agreement amounted to a post-nuptial agree-
ment, 148 that the trial court did not err in refusing to find the agreement
unconscionable, 49 and that the agreement was thus valid and legally en-
forceable.150 The appeals court next determined that since the trust agree-
ment did not mention reimbursement, which is an equitable right rather
than a property right, the wife did not waive the right to reimbursement to
the community estate for the decedent's efforts in improving his separate
property. 5 1 The court found, however, that although the record reflected
some evidence that the community estate should receive reimbursement,' 52
the amount of the jury award was some $500,000 more than the evidence
showed the decedent's efforts on behalf of his separate property were
worth.15
145. Id. at 750 (Cook, J., concurring).
146. 824 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied).
147. Id. at 197-201.
148. Id. at 198. The trust agreement was a post-nuptial agreement because it was an agree-
ment entered after marriage that changed the character of marital property. See id.
149. Id. at 199.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 200.
152. Id. Because some evidence existed, the trial court erred in granting the son's motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Id.




In Union National Bank v. Ornelas-Gutierrez'54 the court examined a
Treasury-bill custodial agreement that included "pay on death" (P.O.D.)
language and concluded that the P.O.D. designation placed on receipts that
the bank issued to the owner of the funds created a written contract. 1 5 5 The
decedent utilized the services of the bank as a broker for purchasing Treas-
ury-bills (T-bills). The bank purchased the T-bills from the Federal Reserve
Bank and held the T-bills for the decedent in the bank's T-bill account at the
Federal Reserve Bank. The bank identified the decedent's specific T-bills
through a special number and provided the decedent only with a receipt,
signed by a bank officer, identifying the T-bills held for the decedent. The
bank placed the terms and conditions of the custodial agreement on the back
of the receipt, but the decedent did not sign the receipt, nor was he required
to do so. On two later occasions the decedent requested the bank to alter the
terms of the custodial agreement to name P.O.D. beneficiaries. A bank of-
ficer altered the custodial receipt, and signed and delivered the altered re-
ceipt to the decedent on each occasion. Following the decedent's death the
bank allowed one of the P.O.D. beneficiaries to order the sale of the T-bills
and the reinvestment of the proceeds through a new custodial agreement
with the bank for the benefit of the two P.O.D. beneficiaries. The temporary
administrator of the decedent's estate claimed that the P.O.D. designation
was insufficient to give the named beneficiaries ownership of the T-bills on
the decedent's death and that the T-bills should be part of the decedent's
estate. The court first concluded that the decedent's relationship with the
bank was a brokerage-custodial relationship rather than that of an account
holder. 156 The court then determined that the beneficiary designation on the
receipt the decedent received from the bank was sufficient to meet the re-
quirements of the Probate Code1 57 and that the two named beneficiaries
were entitled to ownership of the T-bills on the decedent's death.158
In Kitchen v. Sawyer 159 the court upheld the trial court's finding that the
signature card at issue did not create a joint tenancy with right of survivor-
post-trial amendment requesting prejudgment interest. Id. The court reversed and remanded
the cause for a determination of the amount of reimbursement to the community estate. Id.
154. 772 F. Supp. 962 (S.D. Tex. 1991).
155. Id. at 966.
156. Id. Since the relationship was a brokerage-custodial relationship, TEX. PROB. CODE
ANN. §§ 439(a) (Vernon Supp. 1992) and 440 (Vernon 1980), which both require the dece-
dent's signature to any account designation, would not apply, but the agreement would instead
be controlled by TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 450 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1992), which governs
nontestamentary transfers not involving multiparty accounts and which does not expressly
require the decedent's signature to create payment to designated beneficiaries upon the dece-
dent's death.
157. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 450 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1992). The court noted Dicker-
son v. Brooks, 727 S.W.2d 652, 654 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ refd n.r.e.), in
which a Houston court of appeals held that a promissory note providing for payment of the
note to two of the payee's heirs on her death fell within the purview of section 450. 772 F.
Supp. at 966-67.
158. Union Nat'l Bank, 772 F. Supp. at 968.
159. 814 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, writ denied).
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ship' 6° and that extrinsic evidence concerning the intent of the parties to
create a survivorship account was inadmissible. 161 The decedent deposited
$80,000 in the form of a certificate of deposit at a savings institution. The
decedent signed the signature card at the time of the deposit and the other
named account holder signed the signature card at a later time. Neither the
savings institution nor either account holder marked any box on the signa-
ture card to indicate the ownership of the account. Following the decedent's
death, the other account holder filed a declaratory judgment action for de-
termination of the ownership of the certificate of deposit. The savings insti-
tution interpled the funds. The trial court found that the signature card
formed a joint tenancy without a survivorship right and that the proceeds of
the certificate of deposit were assets of decedent's estate. The joint account
holder appealed. On appeal the court noted that the Probate Code162 does
not permit the inference to arise that a joint account is a survivorship agree-
ment merely because it is a joint account. 163 The court found that the signa-
ture card did not meet the requirements of Probate Code § 439(a)164 to
create a right of survivorship. 165 The court further held that the surviving
joint account holder could not offer extrinsic evidence of the intent of the
parties to create a survivorship right at the time of creation of the joint
account. 16
6
In Oadra v. Stegall' 67 the court analyzed an account signature card and
revocable trust agreement.' 6 8 The decedent and his mother opened an ac-
count with a cashier's check, payable to the two of them as co-trustees. Both
signed a signature card for a revocable trust in their capacities as co-trustees.
The decedent's mother signed the back of the signature card, which con-
tained the terms and conditions of the revocable trust and which required
only the signature of the grantor of the trust. The beneficiaries of the trust
were the decedent, his two children, and his two grandchildren. The terms
and conditions of the trust listed on the signature card provided that the
grantor could revoke the trust at any time prior to the grantor's death. Fol-
lowing the decedent's death, his mother removed the funds from the trust
account and opened a new account with the funds. The beneficiaries of the
trust filed suit to determine ownership of the funds and the trial court
160. Id. at 801.
161. Id.
162. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 439(a) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
163. Kitchen, 814 S.W.2d at 800.
164. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 439(a) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
165. 814 S.W.2d at 801.
166. Id.; see Stauffer v. Henderson, 746 S.W.2d 533, 536 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988), afJfd
801 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. 1990); Chopin v. InterFirst Bank Dallas, N.A., 694 S.W.2d 79, 83-84(Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.), disapproved by 801 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. 1990). For
further discussion of these cases, see Lynne M. Candler, Wills and Trusts, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 45 Sw.L.J. 2127, 2137-38 (1992); Lynne M. Candler, Wills and Trusts, Annual
Survey of Texas Law, 43 Sw.L.J. 305, 317-18 (1989); David D. Jackson & Will F. Hartnett,
Wills and Trusts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 40 Sw.L.J. 337, 347-48 (1986).
167. 828 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ granted) (op. on mot.
for reh'g).
168. Id. at 461-64.
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awarded one-fourth of the funds each to decedent's daughter, decedent's two
grandchildren, and decedent's mother. Decedent's mother appealed, con-
tending that she was entitled to all of the funds. On appeal the court found
that the account created by decedent and his mother was a trust account. 169
The court next determined that the decedent's mother continued to be
trustee following her son's death and, pursuant to the terms of the Probate
Code, 170 she was also the beneficial owner of the account. 17' The court fur-
ther bolstered this determination with language from the signature card and
trust agreement itself, which provided that the grantor could revoke the
agreement at any time. 172
V. GUARDIANSHIPS
In Conoco, Inc. v. Ruiz' 73 the court held that the plaintiff's mental incom-
petency tolled the statute of limitations in a personal injury action until the
appointment of a guardian of the incompetent plaintiff's person and es-
tate.' 74 The plaintiff and his wife filed two suits against Conoco and other
defendants following the accident that resulted in the plaintiff's disability.
Both suits were dismissed, one for discovery abuse and one for want of pros-
ecution, prior to the time the plaintiff's wife sought appointment as his
guardian. The county court in the county in which the plaintiff and his wife
resided found that the plaintiff was incompetent and had been incompetent
since the accident that formed the basis for the personal injury actions. Fol-
lowing her appointment as guardian, the wife again filed a wrongful injury
action against Conoco. Conoco attempted to have the suit dismissed be-
cause it was brought more than two years following the date of the accident.
The trial court refused to'dismiss the case and ultimately awarded a signifi-
cant sum in damages to the guardian on behalf of the plaintiff. Conoco ap-
pealed the trial court's decision. On appeal the court found that since the
plaintiff had been of unsound mind since the date of the accident, his incom-
petency tolled the statute of limitations until the appointment of a
guardian. 175
169. Id. at 465; see TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 436(14) (Vernon 1980), which provides the
definition for a trust account.
170. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 438(c) (Vernon 1980).
171. Oadra, 828 S.W.2d at 465.
172. Id. at 467. Only the decedent's mother signed the trust agreement as grantor,
although the jury found that she was not a grantor. The court concluded that the language of
the trust agreement with the bank controlled and the jury's finding thus was not dispositive.
Id. The court also found that the decedent's mother should be awarded attorney's fees and
held that the decedent's daughter and his estate should recover nothing for attorney's fees. Id.
The court further ordered the decedent's daughter to pay the attorney ad litem's fees. Id.
Finally, the court reversed the trial court's award of pre- and post-judgment interest to the
decedent's daughter and his estate. Id.
173. 818 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991), affd in part and rev'd in part, 36
Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 412 (Tex. 1992).
174. Id. at 122.
175. Id. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.001(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1993) pro-
vides that a person of unsound mind is under a legal disability for tolling the two-year statute
of limitations that otherwise would apply under TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 16.003 (Vernon 1986). The court reversed the decision of the trial court in connection with
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In Allison v. Walvoord,176 a mandamus proceeding, the court considered
whether persons who have filed suit against a potential ward have standing
to contest the appointment of a limited guardian, whose sole responsibilities
as guardian would be to defend the suits. 177 Plaintiffs filed two suits against
the proposed ward, in which they sought significant sums of money. Follow-
ing depositions in both cases the plaintiffs determined that they needed to
take the proposed ward's deposition again for additional discovery. The pro-
posed ward's wife filed an application for temporary guardianship, in which
she alleged that the proposed ward was unable to manage himself or his
property in connection with the litigation. The plaintiffs in the two suits
filed objections to the wife's application. The wife asserted that the plaintiffs
did not have standing to contest the limited guardianship, but the trial court
found that the plaintiffs did have standing to contest the appointment. The
trial court further ordered the proposed ward to submit to an examination
and the wife to answer interrogatories and requests for production. Further,
the trial court granted the plaintiffs' request for a jury trial on the appoint-
ment of the guardian. The wife filed a petition for writ of mandamus in-
structing the trial court to vacate its orders. The court found that the
plaintiffs did not have standing to contest the appointment of the limited
guardian because they were not relatives or persons interested in the well-
being of the proposed ward.178
In Massey v. Galvan179 the court held that a step-mother had no legal
right to bind her minor step-children either when she entered a contract with
a personal injury attorney to pursue a wrongful death claim resulting from
her husband's death or when the suit was actually filed.180 The children
lived with the step-mother and their father at the time of his death. Approx-
imately three weeks following the father's death, the step-mother contracted
with the personal injury attorney for him to represent her and the step-chil-
dren in the wrongful death cause of action. Less than two months following
the father's death, the natural mother gave up her guardianship rights to the
children. Within one month of that time, the step-mother filed the wrongful
death suit, and within another month, the probate court appointed the step-
mother guardian of the estate of her step-children. The step-mother never
sought the probate court's approval to pursue the wrongful death cause of
action on behalf of her step-children. Within two months from the date the
step-mother filed the wrongful death suit one of the defendants offered to
settle and the personal injury attorney accepted the offer on behalf of the
step-mother and the children. The probate court later removed the step-
mother as guardian and appointed the children's natural mother as guardian
of their estates. The natural mother contended that the personal injury at-
venue issues that Conoco raised on appeal and ordered the transfer of the cause of action to
Harris County. Conoco, Inc., 818 S.W.2d at 128.
176. 819 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, no writ).
177. Id. at 625.
178. Id. at 627.
179. 822 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
180. Id. at 319.
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torney had only the step-mother's interests in mind in accepting the settle-
ment. An arbitration panel apportioned the award among the step-mother
and the children. The district court awarded the settlement in line with the
recommendations of the arbitration panel. The district court also refused to
enforce against the minors' award the attorney's fees contained in the contin-
gent fee contract the step-mother entered. The appeals court upheld the trial
court's decision concerning the attorney's fees because the step-mother was
not a next friend of the children since their natural mother was their natural
guardian at the time the step-mother entered into the contract with the per-
sonal injury attorney.181 If the step-mother had been appointed as guardian
of the children's estates at the time she entered the contingent fee contract,
she would have had the right to bind them if the probate court approved of
the contract. ' 82
In Rodriguez v. Gonzalez 8 3 the court determined that the guardian of the
estates of minor children should receive the funds recovered in their behalf
in a medical malpractice suit.' 8 4 The guardian, who was the minors' grand-
mother, filed the malpractice suit as their next friend. The grandmother set-
tled the suit on the minors' behalf and the defendants paid the settlement
into the court's registry. The grandmother thereafter filed her application
for guardianship of the estates of the minors and the county court appointed
her guardian. The guardian then filed an application to take possession of
the settlement. The guardian ad litem appointed to represent the minors in
the malpractice suit filed a motion in the district court to create a trust for
the minors with the settlement proceeds. 185 The guardian filed a plea in
abatement to the ad litem's application. At the subsequent hearing, the
guardian proved her qualification as guardian and that the county court had
granted her application for possession of the settlement proceeds. The dis-
trict court, however, granted the ad litem's application for creation of the
trust. On appeal the court found that the guardian should receive the pro-
ceeds from the settlement since a duly qualified and appointed guardian
should have custody and control of the ward's estate. 18 6
In Archer v. FDIC1s 7 the court affirmed the trial court's summary judg-
ment in favor of FDIC in an action brought by a former ward for the bank's
negligent payment of guardianship funds to the guardian. 88 After the mi-
181. Id. at 319.
182. Id. The court stated that only the children's natural mother had the right to bind
them contractually at the time the step-mother entered into the contingent fee agreement. Id.
183. 830 S.W.2d 799 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, no writ).
184. Id. at 801.
185. The Texas Property Code allows the creation of a trust for the benefit of minors if the
minors are not represented by a guardian in a suit and if the trust would be in the minors' best
interest. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 142.001-142.005 (Vernon 1984).
186. 830 S.W.2d at 801; see Decker v. Wiggins, 421 S.W.2d 189, 191-92 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Fort Worth 1967, no writ); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 230, 232 (Vernon 1980). The court
also noted that the current amount of the guardian's bond was too low to protect the interests
of the minors and encouraged the county court to raise the bond to cover the assets of the
estate. 830 S.W.2d at 801.
187. 831 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ).
188. Id. at 483, 485.
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nor ward reached majority the probate court ordered that all guardianship
funds on deposit at various banks should be delivered to the ward. First
RepublicBank issued a check payable to the guardianship estate and the
guardian and delivered the check to the guardian's attorney. The attorney
sent the check to the guardian by certified mail, return receipt requested.
The guardian signed the return receipt, which her attorney received back in
the mail, then she endorsed the check and converted the funds for her own
use. The ward sued First RepublicBank and several other banks. The other
banks had made checks payable to the ward, but had delivered the checks to
the guardian, who forged the ward's signature and converted the funds.
FDIC intervened in the suit as receiver for First RepublicBank. The trial
court entered summary judgment against the ward and the ward appealed.
The appeals court construed Probate Code Section 40918 9 strictly and deter-
mined that the guardian received the check prior to her discharge and while
she still served in her capacity as guardian of the estate.190 Further, the
guardian signed a receipt for the check when she signed the certified mail
return receipt and when she endorsed and cashed the check.1 91 The court
concluded that the guardian and the bank met the requirements of Probate
Code Section 409192 under the facts of this case.' 93
VI. TRUSTS
A. CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS
In Weaver v. Stewart194 the court determined that the trial court incor-
rectly granted summary judgment on the issue of a constructive trust be-
cause a fact issue existed concerning the confidential relationship between
the parties.' 95 The appellant first met the appellee in 1988, when the appel-
lant engaged the appellee's services as a real estate agent for the purpose of
locating waterfront property. The two worked together for some time with-
out locating an appropriate property. Appellant later located a property in
which she was interested and contacted appellee to request appellee's assist-
ance in submitting a contract. Appellee attempted to dissuade appellant
from purchasing the property and ultimately refused to submit a contract on
appellant's behalf. Appellant engaged the services of another agent, who
determined that a contract had already been submitted on the property and,
later, that the buyers under the first contract had purchased the property.
Appellee and her husband purchased the property. Appellant brought suit
against appellee and her husband, as well as appellee's real estate company,
189. The Texas Probate Code provides that until the court orders the discharge of the
personal representative any money due to the ward or estate may be delivered to the personal
representative, who shall sign a receipt, and the payor or obligor will no longer have a legal
obligation for payment. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 409 (Vernon 1980).
190. Archer, 831 S.W.2d at 485.
191. Id.
192. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 409 (Vernon 1980).
193. 831 S.W.2d at 485.
194. 825 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
195. Id. at 185-86.
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under several theories, including constructive trust. The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of appellee. On appeal the court held that the
trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the constructive trust
issue because the existence of a confidential relationship between the parties
was a fact issue that a jury should decide. 196 The dissent would have upheld
the trial court's summary judgment on the constructive trust issue because
no facts existed to show that the parties had a confidential relationship prior
to the transaction that resulted in this suit.197
B. SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS
In Daniels v. Pecan Valley Ranch, Inc. 198 the court considered the issue of
whether a structured settlement annuity resulting from a personal injury suit
is subject to the judgment creditors of the annuitant. 199 The annuitant suf-
fered personal injuries and entered into a structured settlement that provided
monthly payments for life and lump sum payments at specified intervals.
One lump sum payment, in the amount of $50,000, was due to the annuitant
on November 16, 1990. On October 1, 1990, the appellee obtained a defi-
ciency judgment against the annuitant in the amount of $57,934, plus inter-
est. On October 4, 1990, appellee filed an application for writ of
garnishment against the annuity payments; the insurance company received
the writ on October 9, 1990. On November 11 the insurance company
stopped payment on the $51,000 check that it had mailed to the annuitant
for the November monthly payment and the lump sum payment. On No-
vember 15 the appellant received the check, cashed part of it, and deposited
the rest in his account, but the check was subsequently dishonored. The
insurance company and the parties all filed many motions and responses in
several different courts, but the final outcome at the trial level was that the
appellee and the insurance company received a judgment in their favor al-
lowing the payment of the $51,000, plus an additional $2000 in monthly
checks, to appellee. The trial court held that an annuity policy that makes
payments pursuant to the structured settlement is not exempt from creditors
either as an insurance policy or a spendthrift trust. On appeal the court
determined that the annuity policy was not a spendthrift trust 2°° and that
the assets were not exempt from garnishment. 20' The court further held that
the annuity was not exempt as a life insurance policy since it was not a life
196. Id. at 186. The court also held that the trial court erred in granting summary judg-
ment on all causes of action because the appellees had merely moved for summary judgment
on the constructive trust issue. Id. at 185.
197. Id. at 187 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
198. 831 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied).
199. Id. at 375.
200. Id. at 379. The court based this conclusion on the fact that the insurance company
owed the annuitant no duty except to make the payments to him at the times stipulated. The
insurance company had no duty to hold separate assets for the benefit of the annuitant or to
preserve premiums for his benefit, so probably no trust existed at all, but if a trust did exist, it
was a passive trust and not a spendthrift trust. Id.





In Rauch v. Patterson203 the court examined the issue of the duty that a
trustee owes to a business invitee to trust premises. 2°4 Three trustees man-
aged a beach house, which was an asset held in trust. An independent con-
tractor fell through the stairway of the beach house while carrying a
refrigerator up the stairs. The independent contractor sued one of the trust-
ees individually and received a judgment in his favor. The trustee appealed,
asserting, among other things, that he had no individual liability and that he
should not have been sued individually, but rather in his capacity as trustee.
The court found that the appellant held legal title to the property as trustee
and that he had the use and possession of the trust property. 20 5 The court
also found that the appellant called the appellee from time to time to make
repairs to the property and that the appellant had never informed appellee
that he was not owner of the property.2°6 Appellant thus owed appellee a
duty to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition or to warn ap-
pellee of any known danger. 207
D. DISTRIBUTIONS FROM TRUSTS
In First National Bank v. Arrow Oil & Gas, Inc.208 the court held that a
bank could not setoff funds held in trust for the benefit of working interest
and royalty interest owners for a debt that the operating company owed the
bank. 209 The operating company received a check, payable only to it, for the
June 1987 gas runs on a particular well. The operating company placed the
check in its mineral account. Before the operating company could issue
checks to the various working interest and royalty owners, the bank took the
amount of the deposit for the well to offset a debt that the operating com-
pany owed to the bank. A working interest owner and others notified the
bank that the funds actually belonged to them, but the bank refused to re-
turn the funds. The bank later filed a declaratory judgment action in which
it requested the trial court to find that it did not convert the funds wrong-
fully. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of the benefi-
ciaries of the account on the basis that, although the bank was unaware that
the monies on deposit were held for the benefit of others, the equitable ex-
ception to the bank's right of setoff210 prevented the bank from offsetting the
202. Id.
203. 832 S.W.2d 57 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
204. Id. at 59.
205. Id. The appellant cited cases showing lack of control of non-owners of the property,
but the court found that these cases were not on point. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. 818 S.W.2d 159 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1991, no writ).
209. See id. at 163.
210. The trial court based this exception on National Indemnity Co. v. Spring Branch State
Bank, 162 Tex. 521, 348 S.W.2d 528 (1961), in which the court held that, even if a bank has no
knowledge that some or all of the funds are being held for the benefit of third parties, the bank
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funds on deposit against the debt the operating company owed to the bank.
The appeals court agreed. 2 11
In Kolpack v. Torres2 12 the court held that the trial court erred in ordering
the trustee of a discretionary trust to make child support payments to the
beneficiary's child because the trial court did not first obligate the beneficiary
to pay the child support. 21 3 The trial court found that the beneficiary of a
discretionary distribution trust was the father of a minor child. The child's
mother then made a claim for child support and joined the trustee as well as
the father. The trial court ordered the father to pay $105 per month in child
support and the trustee to pay $348 per month. The trustee appealed. On
appeal the court considered the issue of whether the trial court could impose
a duty on the trustee to make distributions of trust income for child support
when the trial court did not first impose the child support obligation on the
beneficiary-parent. 21 4 The court considered provisions of the Texas Family
Code2 15 and determined that the trial court may only order distributions
from a discretionary distribution trust if the beneficiary-parent is first obli-
gated to make the child support payments. 216
In O'Malley v. Stratton217 the court construed the language creating a tes-
tamentary trust to determine the ownership of accrued but undistributed
income upon termination of the trust. 218 The testator created several testa-
mentary trusts in her will, including the one in issue. The testator later
amended the provisions of this testamentary trust by codicil. The will and
codicil together provided that all of the income of the trust would be distrib-
uted to the testator's sister during the sister's life, then would be distributed
to the sister's son until the earlier of January 1, 1990, or his death, when the
trust was to terminate and be distributed to other persons. A dispute arose
between the nephew and the remainder beneficiaries concerning oil and gas
royalty income earned prior to January 1, 1990, but not paid to the trust
until after that date. The appeals court considered the language concerning
the trust contained in the will and codicil and concluded that the testator
intended for her nephew to receive all accrued income as of January 1, 1990,
whether or not the trustee had actually received the income as of that
date.2 19
may not setoff the funds held for the benefit of the third parties against the depositor's debt.
818 S.W.2d at 531.
211. 818 S.W.2d at 162-63.
212. 829 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied).
213. Id. at 916.
214. Id. at 915.
215. The Texas Family Code provides that a court may order the trustee of a trust to make
distributions for child support to the extent that the trustees must make distributions to the
beneficiary-parent, but if the trust has a discretionary distribution standard, the court may
only order the trustee to distribute income, not principal, for child support. TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 14.05(c) (Vernon 1986).
216. 829 S.W.2d at 916.
217. 831 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, no writ).
218. Id. at 35-38.
219. Id. at 38.
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